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Digest: Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara
Katayon Khajebag
Opinion by Baxter, J., expressing the unanimous view of the
court.
Issue
Is a public employer required to offer formal immunity from
the use of incriminating statements in response to an employee’s
invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination before it can dismiss the employee for refusing to
answer questions in connection with its investigation?
Facts
In January 2003, a Santa Clara deputy public defender
(“plaintiff”) represented Michael Dignan on charges of
ammunition possession by a felon.1 Dignan was arrested with
Troy Boyd, his roommate.2 As part of the defense strategy,
plaintiff sought to introduce Boyd’s statement to the police that
his parents owned the house where the ammunition was located.
Boyd also stated that he was renting the home from his parents
at the time of the arrest. Plaintiff hoped that this testimony
would create reasonable doubt as to whether Dignan had control
of the area in which the ammunition was found.3 However, Boyd
testified he had sublet portions of the home to other people in the
past, including Dignan.4 When the prosecutor moved to exclude
Boyd’s statement as hearsay, plaintiff noted that Boyd was
unavailable at the time of trial and the statement would fall
within a hearsay exception and thus could be admitted.5
At a hearing on the matter, plaintiff stated that a warrant
was out for Boyd’s arrest and “if the San Jose Police are not going
to be able to find Mr. Boyd, I think that my investigator is going
to be very hard put to find . . . ” him as well.6 After the hearing, a
police sergeant was able to contact Mr. Boyd simply by going to
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the house where the ammunition was found.7 Boyd told the
police officer that he had “recently spoken to ‘a public defender
Plaintiff was confronted with Mr. Boyd’s
investigator.’”8
statement and he confessed to speaking with Boyd.9 However,
plaintiff maintained that any conversation he may have had with
Boyd was “attorney work product”10 and therefore he was under
no obligation to disclose the content of the conversation.11 The
prosecutor argued that plaintiff had purposefully misled the
court.12 The court did not rule on potential ethical violations, and
instead ruled that Boyd was in fact an available witness and
would consider the objection to the admission of Boyd’s
statement.13
Some time later, the Chief Assistant Public Defender, David
Mann, learned of plaintiff’s potential misconduct and that the
prosecutor in the Dignan case intended “to ‘go after’ [plaintiff] in
some manner.”14 This meant one of three possibilities: file
misdemeanor charges against plaintiff, report plaintiff to the
State Bar, or let the Public Defender’s office take care of the
plaintiff’s discipline.15 Shortly after learning about the incident,
Mann launched an internal investigation. On April 1, 2003
plaintiff and his attorney appeared for an interview on the
matter; several department heads were also present, including
Mann. During the course of the first interview, plaintiff refused
to answer any questions.16 Each time the following admonition
was made to plaintiff: “you have a right to remain silent and not
incriminate yourself. Your silence, however, may be deemed
insubordination, leading to administrative discipline up to and
including termination. Any statement made during this interview
cannot . . . be used against you in any subsequent criminal
proceeding.”17 In response to the admonition, plaintiff’s attorney
responded that such an admonition did not apply to public
defenders and as such any protection from criminal prosecution
must be administered via a formal court order.18 At a subsequent
interview on the same matter plaintiff again refused to answer
certain questions and on June 9, 2003 plaintiff was discharged
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for: “(1) insubordination . . . (2) gross misconduct unbecoming a
county officer, and (3) seeking, in violation of office rules
governing attorney ethics, to mislead a court by artifice or false
statement.”19 An administrative hearing upheld the charges and
the related discipline.20
Plaintiff sought mandamus relief in the Superior Court,
arguing that he was improperly dismissed for refusing to answer
his employer’s questions.21 In addition, plaintiff argued that his
refusal to answer certain questions was based on his right
against self-incrimination.22 Finally, plaintiff argued that his
right against self-incrimination was properly invoked as his
employer never obtained a formal grant of criminal use
immunity.23 The Superior Court disagreed and upheld the
actions of the Public Defender’s Office.24 The court of appeal
reversed, finding that “a public employee must receive a formal
grant of criminal use immunity before being required, on pain of
discipline, to answer potentially incriminating official questions
about his or her job performance.”25 The California Supreme
Court granted review.
Analysis
Both the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and the California Constitution state that no person shall “‘be
compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against
themselves.’”26 These provisions not only guarantee protection
from self-incrimination from being forced to testify against
oneself, but also protects a person from answering questions in
any other proceeding “civil or criminal, formal or informal”27
where the person reasonably believes the answers will be
incriminating in a subsequent criminal case. Additionally, one
cannot be forced to choose between their job and asserting the
privilege.28 Put another way, one cannot be put in a position
where asserting the privilege will subject them to punishment. 29
The only exception is when the refusal to answer would frustrate
“legitimate governmental objectives;” in such a situation the use

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1131 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V. § 3; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15).
Id. (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)).
Id.
Id.

Do Not Delete

460

5/10/2010 12:28 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:457

of immunity is proper in order to compel the individual to answer
the otherwise potentially incriminating questions.30
This rule has been extended to a public employer’s threat of
punishment to an employee who refuses to answer potentially
incriminating questions. Thus, it is a well-established rule that
“incriminating answers coerced from a public employee under
threat of dismissal cannot be used against the employee in a
criminal proceeding.”31 However, this protection against selfincrimination does not extend to protect an individual from nonpenal adverse use of incriminating statements.32 Therefore, an
employee who makes incriminating statements under threat of
potential employment discipline may still be punished, and even
terminated so long as the employee’s right to self-incrimination
in criminal proceedings is protected.33 However, the employee
cannot be punished simply for invoking his Constitutional right
against self-incrimination, even with assurances that his
answers will not be used in criminal proceedings against him.34
In this case, the plaintiff and the court of appeal used several
California statutes35 to come to the conclusion that:
One subjected to coercive official questioning in a noncriminal setting
is constitutionally privileged to refuse to answer unless personally
immunized, and, if personal immunity is denied, or is unavailable
from an authorized source, the person cannot be sanctioned for
remaining silent, but if one does speak under official compulsion,
without the protection of formal immunity, the Constitution
nonetheless prohibits direct or derivative use of the statements in a
criminal prosecution against the declarant.36

However, both California cases as well as the Supreme Court
have held differently.37 Those cases have held time and time
again that a public employee may, under threat of employment
sanctions, be compelled to answer potentially incriminating
questions so long as they are still afforded the protection of the
Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court, in Garrity v. New Jersey,38 and its
progeny,39 has stated that a public employee cannot be
Id.
Id. (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496–97 (1967)).
Id. (citing Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal.3d 878, 886–87 (1973)).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1133 (citing various California statutes).
36 Id. at 1132.
37 Id. at 1133–34.
38 385 U.S. 493, 496–97 (1967).
39 See Gardner v. Broderick 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (discussing a New York police officer
that was asked to sign a waiver of his Fifth Amendment right and was told that failure to
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terminated simply for invoking the protection of the Fifth
Amendment. However the Court noted that if an employer
coerces an employee to answer questions that are “specifically,
directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official
duties on pain of dismissal without requiring relinquishment of
the benefits of the constitutional privilege”40 the dismissal would
not be the result of invoking the privilege.
The court therefore rejected the court of appeal’s reasoning
that authorized criminal use immunity was necessary before a
public employee could be coerced into answering potentially
incriminating statements.41 Thus, within the instant matter, no
state or federal constitutional provision, nor any case law allowed
plaintiff to refuse to answer potentially incriminating statements
until or unless he received criminal use immunity.42
Holding
Neither the California Constitution, nor the Federal
Constitution provide that immunity must granted against
criminal use before a public employee is forced to answer
potentially incriminating questions.43 Additionally, a public
employer may terminate an employee for failure to answer
questions if the employee’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in a criminal prosecution is maintained.44
Legal Significance
As a result of this decision, the California Supreme Court
reaffirmed the notion that public employees may be forced to
answer questions so long as the employee is not required on pain
of job termination to forfeit his right against self-incrimination in
a subsequent criminal proceeding.

do so would lead to his termination); Spevack v. Klein 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (holding that
an attorney cannot be disbarred solely for refusing to answer questions at a disciplinary
hearing on the basis of his Fifth Amendment right); Sanitation Men v. Sanitation
Comm’r. 392 U.S 280 (1968) (discussing employees that were told they would be
terminated if they invoked their right against self-incrimination in order to avoid
testifying before the commissioner).
40 Spielbauer, 199 P.3d at 1134 (citing Sanitation Men).
41 Id. at 1141.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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